

Rethinking the Teaching of Philosophy

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Recent questioning of traditional philosophy has a wider basis than that provided in Richard Rorty's writings, even though he is sometimes (misleadingly) credited with having initiated a widespread soul-searching among contemporary philosophers. In the first part of this paper, I shall characterize the main features of this questioning and point to its wider sources. The chief criticism of the tradition is that it unwarrantedly confines philosophy, and its teaching, to what I call a "realist mode." Agreeing that this criticism has validity, I suggest, in the second part of the paper, how the teaching of philosophy may be modified to overcome the traditional bias. The recommendation proceeds from the assumption that a historicist approach, combined with the acknowledgement of the centrality of language, would put the teaching of philosophy on a sounder track. As I shall claim in the final section, among the benefits of this change, already observable in many current professional and pedagogical activities of philosophers, will be an extension of philosophical thought to other cultural areas. By letting go of the (mistaken) idea that philosophy has access to special facts and concepts indigenous to its own domain, philosophers, both as practitioners and as teachers, are likely to play a more useful role in the intellectual life of our culture.

The Realist Mode

When Richard Rorty suggested a distinction between philosophy and Philosophy, many of his readers took this suggestion as advocating an end to philosophical thinking.¹ Nothing could be further from the truth. The thrust of his criticism of the dominance of epistemology in the history of philosophy was to call into question the traditional tendency to philosophize in what could be called a "realist mode." Philosophers were obsessed with the idea that it is their task to find the key to the Heart of Reality, to describe the World As It Really Is, to discover the Nature of Things, to lay bare Reality's Own Language, to fathom the Essence of Everything, to find out what things look like from God's Point of View. It is that ambition that elevated epistemology to such a prominent status,

energizing the drive to formulate a definitive theory of truth and to produce a systematic, criteriological account of the way human descriptions correspond to reality. Although punctuated by occasional dissent, this "realist mode" continues up to and includes Kant who set for himself the task of formulating the conditions of all experience. But Kant's "Copernican Revolution," by locating critical powers in the human subject, shifted attention from Reality As Such to human interpretive capacities. The realist mode is questioned in Hegel's historicism, Nietzsche's perspectivism, Heidegger's analysis of *Dasein*, Wittgenstein's attention to language, and Dewey's instrumentalism. These philosophers, and the host of thinkers who followed their lead, which includes people like Ryle, Quine, Sellars, Davidson, Derrida, and Foucault, have forced a radical rethinking about the desirable objectives of philosophizing.

Rorty's recommended distinction between Philosophy and philosophy is a fruit of such rethinking. The distinction does not question the importance of the concept of truth; it merely points to the desirability of keeping it available for claims and views whose warrantedness, justifiability, and acceptability we have no reason to question. Because we can appeal to a whole range of standards, principles, and rules which help to determine the reasonableness of candidates for belief, a restriction of this wide range to a uniform theory of truth merely results in limiting our linguistic resources in making a case for some descriptions or courses of action. So when Rorty advocates that pride of place be shifted from Truth to Freedom, he is not making light of truth and certainly does not deny its importance for any discourse.² He is merely questioning the obsession with finding the *one* definition of truth, in order to use that definition to arbitrate the acceptability of the results of all forms of inquiry or deliberation. He thinks that preoccupation with the theory of truth is fruitless, and not surprisingly so, because, in fact, the usefulness of "true" stems from its wide, context-dependent applicability. This is why he recommends that we retain that wide usefulness and refrain from forcing the word "truth" into a Procrustean bed by arbitrary definition. Nothing is lost if we settle for the Jamesian suggestion that we accept as true what is "good in the way of belief." Like William James, Rorty does not suggest that we do *without* the concept of truth, but, again like James and other pragmatists, he sees the banishment of this concept from all discourse *except* narrow criteriological inquiry as arbitrarily limiting human freedom in its attempts to cope successfully with experience.

The Truth/Freedom juxtaposition is echoed in another one: Objectivity/Solidarity.³ Rorty's recommendation that "solidarity" be put ahead of "objectivity" does not amount to advocating either subjectivity or emotivism or irrationality. He sees the philosophical notion of objectivity as a seductive bedfellow of essentialism, as promising closure to the quest for understanding. Assuming that all "final vocabularies" are fallible and

revisable, he believes that we are less likely to delude ourselves with thinking that we have the final truth about anything if instead we settle for the de-facto consensus of those whose competence in a given areas of expertise we have good reasons to trust. To the extent that we can claim a degree of expertise ourselves, we may be often entitled to offer a confident judgment. "Solidarity" is the name for a context in which, intellectually or practically, "the buck stops" or "the spade is turned."⁴ Since solidarity connotes intersubjective agreement, it is not really *contrasted* to objectivity, for in such an agreement some states of affairs are seen as holding for everyone. When a community comes to share a language and when it follows a common practice, the very *existence* of such a sharing allows for a determination of states of affairs unquestionably regarded as objective facts. "Solidarity" is a label for such a state of affairs.⁵

Besides seeking to articulate essentialist conceptions of truth and objectivity, our Philosophical tradition favored a discovery of pre-existing structures (exemplified in Plato's Theory of Forms and in Kant's Doctrine of the Categories) over creative attempts to invent new models and paradigms. Rorty does not deny the importance of the systematic, criteriological discourse, which favors precise definition and the search for stable structures. In *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature*, he notes that such discourse is always present as a background to reconstructive moves.⁶ The Deweyan use of the word "reconstruction" is broad enough to accommodate other terms used by Rorty for the same purpose: reaction, edification, hermeneutics. His (limited) sympathy for Derridean decentering or deconstruction can be attributed to the same motivation: to encourage a fresh look at concepts that have become ossified, because they have been nourished, as Wittgenstein put it, by a "one-sided diet."⁷ When Rorty recommends that systematic, criteriological discourse be supplemented by reactive, edifying talk, he does not advocate irresponsible and ad-libbing and does not suppose that funded knowledge and received wisdom are irrelevant. To the contrary, as revolutionary science makes sense only against the background of normal science, and as the reach of new metaphors can be effective only in the context of literal language, so the introduction of new vocabulary must start with the awareness of and respect for the function of the vocabulary still in place.

The Historicist/Linguistic Turn

To teach philosophy today is to be confronted by a choice. 1) One may continue viewing and teaching philosophy in what I have called a "realist mode," that is, to treat philosophical thought as mirroring a pre-existent reality. 2) One will take seriously the historicist/linguistic turn, attributed to the large group of philosophers mentioned above. Not to make the second choice is to ignore the development of our intellectual life during

the last two centuries. Hegel is a pivotal figure in this drama, having described the endless process of *Aufhebung* or sublimation, in which earlier descriptions are transcended in later ones. Of course, it is possible to squeeze Hegel, and every contemporary philosopher as well, into a realist mode by taking seriously his notion of the Absolute as eternally encompassing the world process, although his identification of this process with freedom makes a realist interpretation problematic. Nietzsche's claim that we have nothing but interpretation all the way down is truer to Hegel's historicist emphasis. The linguistic side complements the historicist turn, lifting to prominence the role of language in all philosophical descriptions and questioning the resort to "superconcepts." The work of Wittgenstein, Ryle, and Austin caused consternation among traditional philosophers, who were (mistakenly) dismayed by the prospect of having to limit themselves to "ordinary language." But the attack on metaphysics proceeded on a broad front, spearheaded by logical positivists, evolutionists, and pragmatists of all stripes.

So it was not necessarily big news when Heidegger credited Nietzsche with having brought on "the end of metaphysics." But as Rorty pointed out, neither Heidegger nor many of his followers, including Derrida, managed to free themselves of metaphysics.⁸ Heidegger continued to privilege certain words and phrases as being beyond redescription, and Derrida was still willing to ply certain (invented) locutions as "non-concepts."⁹ For this reason, Rorty is inclined to treat them as "ironist metaphysicians," noting, however, that in his latest writings Derrida appears to be abandoning previous Heideggerian metaphysical leanings.

Rorty's use of the label "ironism" rounds out the historicist/linguistic turn. Having been impressed by the work of all those many philosophers who helped to make it, he concludes that redescription is a permanent possibility for philosophy. A living language feeds on *poesis* and metaphor, constantly enriching vocabularies that help to articulate our understanding of the world. Mindful of the possibility of putting language to political uses, and noticing that this sometimes (as was certainly the case with Nietzsche) results in unfortunate abuses, Rorty recommends that we keep the private and the public uses of redescription separate.¹⁰ If we do so, we will be able to utilize philosophical redescriptions to create our self-images, but will scrutinize the applicability of such redescriptions to public matters in the light of our shared moral and political convictions, using democratic processes for dissemination and persuasion. Rorty confesses that by making this distinction, he benefited greatly from reading ironist metaphysicians but found their political recommendations, explicit or implied, largely useless.

It seems to me that Rorty's recommendation can be profitably extended to all of philosophy. Its history and its specialized branches can be a source of historicist/linguistic information about things worth noting

and paying attention to—both with regard to enriching our self-understanding and with regard to its possible application to public affairs. Freed of the compulsion to view the development of philosophical thought as approximations to discovering “the nature of things,” we can examine it for its contributions to our search for what is aesthetically, morally, or politically rewarding. Having made the historicist/linguistic turn, we will not feel that we are being beastly to our philosophical ancestors, if we refuse to follow them in hoping to uncover some pre-existing essences. But as creative commentators on what they observed and found worthy of note, they will remain an invaluable resource and sometimes an inspiration. So when we trace the drift of arguments and counterarguments, we will not look upon them as pointing to *aporias*, as gaps in true accounts of reality, but will appraise and appreciate them for their novelty, beauty, ingenuity, or a potentially shareable insight.

What difference would it make to teaching philosophy, if we were to take this recommendation seriously? It would be considerable. Take some examples from the history of philosophy. The Parmenides-Plato-Descartes-Kant line, although dominant, is not unbroken. When later Presocratics turned their backs on the Ionian thinkers who insisted on sticking to the “quintessentialist” question “*What is the basic substance?*” and instead introduced a vocabulary aimed at describing *how* things behave and how they are arranged or ordered, they opened up a vast new intellectual territory, still being explored today. Nuclear physics may have little in common with Democritus’s atomic theory, and yet it can be traced back to him. When Aristotle rejected Plato’s absolute separation of form and matter and instead started talking about actuality/potentiality, he replaced the idealistic Platonic dualism with his own naturalistic monism, thus making Nature the all-encompassing subject of science. In modern philosophy, modifications of key concepts produced brand-new metaphysical systems. Descartes’s confused talk of two finite substances, mental and material, received an elegant resolution in Spinoza’s reconstruction of “substance” as necessarily one, self-caused, and self-contained. Leibniz “deconstructed” the Cartesian theory in still another way by taking a new look at what Descartes was willing to subsume under “extension.” The result was a monadology, inspiring a string of future “process philosophies,” including those of Hegel, Peirce, and Whitehead.

Or take the intellectual drama of British empiricism. Berkeley’s dissatisfaction with what Locke understood by “primary qualities” and by “abstraction” prompted him to formulate a provocative attack on the concept of material substance. Hume found Berkeley’s theory unconvincing but irrefutable, which conclusion led *him* to invent his own skeptical and revolutionary terminology that pointed to the limitations of reasoning and to the problems of induction. Reacting to the Humean impasse, Kant introduced his revolutionary (“Copernican”) terminology of the

alleged necessary conditions of experience, lodged *a priori* in the mind, thus derailing the smug empiricist assumption that everything we know comes from experience.

A part of that terminology Kant could also employ to construct a new track for ethics. According to him, moral principles cannot be derived from any natural or anthropological facts but have their source elsewhere. He invited us to talk about morality in a way that stressed its autonomy, thus giving rise to a flood of subsequent theories, eventually transforming ethical discourse into a debate between naturalists and non-naturalists. That debate was in part fueled by the desire to reconcile the claims of presupposed shared moral values, such as the importance of integrity and character and of the desirability of satisfying natural human needs. The centrality of justice and equality in all philosophical debates about ethics testifies to the requirement of every society to establish fair institutions and procedures. Deontological theories have as their background the respect for duties and obligations as the necessary condition for a decent social framework, and teleological theories acknowledge the reasonableness of furthering legitimate interests and desires.

While ethical and political theorizing typically occurs in a context of public concerns, the values to be secured can be also important for private fulfillment. Among such values is the desire for self-creation, and all branches of philosophical thought can contribute to that end. The life of the mind is enhanced when we study conceptual transformations that took place in the history of philosophical thought in any of its domains. Such transformations may be motivated by the desire to escape perceived dead ends and to look for more promising starts. It was the promise of such starts that induced inventive thinkers to label themselves as Platonists, Cartesians, Kantians, empiricists, utilitarians, or logical positivists. The history of philosophy is not, as Whitehead claimed, "a series of footnotes to Plato," but a succession of attempts to break away from accounts that have revealed themselves to be in some ways defective and to replace them with fresh and novel descriptions. Intellectual progress consists of such moments of reconstruction, where previous structures are set aside or modified in order to get rid of blocks, blind spots, confusions, contradictions, and infelicities. This is how the original thinkers' freedom to experiment with new vocabularies serve the interest of truth, understood not in terms of some presupposed theory, but as progressive, self-correcting redescriptions and retextualizations. When Rorty suggests that we should put Freedom ahead of Truth, he points out that it is only sensible and desirable to leave free space for such reconstructions.

When this suggestion is followed, the teaching of philosophy will not regard itself as a sort of archeological enterprise, aiming at exhuming some alleged deep-lying foundations discovered by infallible thinkers. One lesson derived from studying the history of philosophy is that our

views on what the world is like, or what we want ourselves and our societies to be, are amenable to changes, corrections, and even radical departures. Philosophy is what philosophers have made it. And they are still making and remaking it. This is why the focus of instruction and discussion should be the particular junctures at which new departures and fresh starts are made, when novel metaphors are introduced, when original paradigms creep into a discourse. Both the teacher and the student find their mutual time well spent when they can share an appreciation of such *transitions*—when a concept is reconstructed, or when a surprising departure from an entrenched position explores untried possibilities that may lead to fresh perceptions and new insights. The classroom is a place where such transitions can be brought to the surface, can be looked at in the light of shared knowledge and concerns, and where opinions voiced by students are subjected to a critical scrutiny of peers and teacher.

As a free creation of the human mind, philosophy is closer to poetry than to science. Like them, however, it can be studied and enjoyed for its own sake. Logical and mathematical theorems have their own kind of beauty which can absorb the attention of an analytic mind. And so can any other branch of philosophy: metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of science. All those branches existed long enough to develop a corpus of theories with interesting, sometimes fascinating, genealogies. The history of philosophy abounds in systematic edifices, which often have a self-contained elegance and acquire an added interest when compared with others.¹¹ Philosophical mutations and transformations have their own intrinsic drama. If felicitous, a new idea acquires a life of its own; it is explored in depth, ramified, refocused. In some cases it may require several generations of thinkers to exploit the full implications of a train of thought or to embroider upon it in original and unexpected ways.¹²

The British pragmatist F. C. S. Schiller envisaged a proliferation of private intellectual delights in an unabashed creation of philosophical systems. “‘Systems’ of philosophy will abound as before, and will be as varied as ever. But they will probably be more brilliant in their coloring, and more attractive in their form. For they will certainly have to be put forward, and acknowledged, as works of art that bear the impress of a unique and individual soul.”¹³ Conscious of the fact that philosophical constructions are free expressions of the human mind, a student will not be eager to test them for their objectivity, but will examine them for what they can contribute to his desire to cope with the world in terms of believable opinions. To the extent that one finds oneself sharing such opinions with others, one can feel with them a variant of what Rorty calls solidarity. In many instances this solidarity will be extensive and robust enough to be unhesitatingly labeled as representing truth, i.e., that which is, in William James’s phrase, good in the way of belief. In such situations,

the sense of difference between solidarity and objectivity, for all theoretical and practical purposes, disappears.

The kind of solidarity that can emerge from the study of philosophy has special features. Because it originates in a tentative, exploratory, experimental realm of the imagination, it alerts people to one another in the delicate and sensitive areas of the mind, often filled with uncertainty and doubt. The novel, the unfamiliar can be also disturbing. This is why it sometimes runs the risk of humiliating. Rorty recognizes this danger when he observes that no one wants to be redescribed in someone else's vocabulary.¹⁴ But redescription, by appealing to curiosity and the sense of adventure, can also speak to our hopes. There are times when we perceive how some other mind has extended its and our understanding by inventing a new idea, a fresh perspective, a helpful novel vocabulary. Effective teaching of philosophy will pay attention to such moments, because in addition to providing the particular insight in question, such attention will foster a critical and reflective attitude to whatever one is prepared to believe. Seeing themselves as "midwives" of the process in which an appreciation of the birth of new ideas dawns on their students, philosophy teachers will discern in their profession a renewed sense of importance.

Philosophy Democratized

The reluctance to let go of the delusion that philosophy has autonomous access to some special facts or superpowerful concepts underlies the resistance to taking the historicist/linguistic approach seriously. A good example is found in the article by Donald Walhout, "Hermeneutics and the Teaching of Philosophy."¹⁵ While acknowledging that Rorty's advocacy of a hermeneutical approach is salutary and claiming that in fact in some form or other it has been always utilized by every good teacher who does not merely ape traditional foundationalism, Walhout nevertheless argues that "the natural progress would be from hermeneutics to traditional Western philosophy rather than the reverse."¹⁶ He defends what I have called "the realist mode" because he regards truth as "an ontological concept designating what is the case regardless of human opinion."¹⁷ One is moved to ask, *whose* opinion is it to be if not of some human beings. (Are we back at God's-eye view?) Not surprisingly, the specification of "what is the case" apart from what is rendered in some linguistic account or other is not offered, but instead the appeal is made to the need for "good reasons and arguments." Philosophers, however, are not in a possession of a distinctive mode of argumentation not available to other intellectuals—lawyers, anthropologists, economists.

Concerning the role of argument in philosophy, Kai Nielsen in, *After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy*,¹⁸ effectively defends Rorty's position, pointing out that arguments are

neutral with regard to substantive claims made for or against a conclusion. There are no context-independent criteria for validity and rationality. "There is no determining what is rational by some extra-historical, universal set of criteria. There is and can be no such ahistorical legitimation."¹⁹ Accepting Wittgenstein's and Rorty's denial that our discourses and arguments can rest on an Archimedean point, Nielsen, unlike Walhout, is prepared to jettison what he calls "the Tradition." Nevertheless, he holds out for a possibility of "critical theory with a progressive emancipatory thrust," a comprehensive theory that would serve as a successor to traditional philosophy. Such a theory would display coherence among considered moral convictions and principles and would involve empirical theories about the social world and human nature. But the construction of such theories, admits Nielsen, cannot "avoid starting from tradition and some consensus."²⁰ Furthermore, the application of critical theory would have to deal with "incommensurabilities incapable of being brought under a set of rules or procedures that will tell us how rational agreement can be achieved or how we could reasonably settle disputes."²¹

These two admissions are sufficient, I believe, to conclude that the critical theory Nielsen adumbrates cannot consist of any more than *ad hoc* heuristic devices to illuminate particular social contexts in which practical deliberation is called for. Hopeful that incommensurabilities are not immovable and that, working from a present consensus, a resolution of a conflict may be arrived at, we need not think of ourselves as stuck in "conceptual imprisonment" or subscribe to "a postmodernist alienation of reason." Such a non-foundationalist, non-Archimedean approach comes very close to what Rorty shares with Dewey and what separates both of them from the "inhumanism" of Foucault.²²

A comprehensive critical theory is but a dream for the same reason that Philosophy needs to be replaced by philosophy. The ambition to lock up our ongoing efforts to take into account growing contact with still unexplored phenomena and contingencies in the world is what Nietzsche called "the will to a system," which he suspected of being stupid. As our knowledge grows, as our instruments of investigation proliferate, and as our perceptions and sensitivities expand, we need to give them requisite attention and imaginative articulation, thus making philosophy (with a small *p*) constantly relevant. Philosophy has to be democratized and our reason has to remain hermeneutic, plastic and elastic enough to enable us to cope with new perceptions and unforeseen discoveries. For the same reason, we need to keep the notion of truth (small *t*) available for signaling sentences worth believing. Restricting the concept of Truth to a definition articulated in a formal theory will unduly limit our inquiries and conversations and is likely to exclude propositions we might find important enough to affirm. This is a lesson we should have learned from the

failed attempt of logical positivism to ban ethical propositions from the universe of meaningful discourse.

Although not possessing any special kind of knowledge not accessible to workers in other intellectual and practical domains, philosophically trained people can perform useful functions in socially valued enterprises. Their usefulness comes from familiarity with particular analytical procedures, theories, and descriptions of phenomena produced over time in various segments of philosophical discourse, including logic and epistemology. Such a preparation can come in good stead when there is a need to construct piecemeal critical theories, designed to cope effectively with problems of concern to specific sciences or professions. A cluster of such theories may at times have enough convergence to justify giving them a common name. What today goes under the name of "cognitive science," involving a collaboration of philosophers with scholars in biology, neurology, and empirical psychology, may be an example of such a convergence.

A symbiosis of philosophy with other areas of human concern is much in evidence in the areas labeled as "applied philosophy." Philosophers who have moved into these areas have found that conceptual tools developed in philosophical literature can be useful in the fields of medicine, business, law, or technology. These fields cannot avoid dealing with issues that are ethical in nature. Such issues may receive a more satisfactory articulation and resolution when seen in terms of some distinctions developed in abstract ethical theories. In turn, those theories themselves are sharpened and clarified when they are brought to bear on problems specific to a given professional field. The concept of euthanasia, for example, gets a concrete articulation when examined in a context of actual decisions confronted by physicians and hospitals; the marriage of theory and practice enriches both. It is unlikely that the professions to which philosophers have attached themselves would be happy to dispense with such help. Nor would people whose interest is primarily conceptual and theoretical be willing to do without information and data that only exposure to real life situations can provide.

Successes of "applied philosophy" help dispose of the fear that philosophy as a subject will disappear when it joins forces with other intellectual and practical enterprises. Versions of the doctrine of natural rights, for instance, can be relevant to aspirations of minorities struggling to be fully included in the economic, social, and political activities of the nation, although, as the recent confirmation hearings of the Supreme Court nominee Clarence Thomas show, the public may be understandably concerned when a particular philosophical or religious version of natural law appears to furnish the main foundation for a legal decision. Still, a philosophical view may inform beliefs held by members of a community. The advantages of multiculturalism are sometimes defended in the light of

distinctions developed and values affirmed in social and political theories, drawing, for example, on vocabularies invented by such figures as Locke, Rousseau, or Jefferson. This means that attempts to reconstruct society have a better chance of succeeding if they are undertaken against the background of relevant philosophical documents.

The admission that philosophy does not draw on some special facts but must orient itself within a field of facts accessible to the culture as a whole can have as a consequence a greater openness to what agitates that culture. Such openness is likely to encourage attentiveness toward creative work done in areas other than philosophy. One will pay attention to what is going on in different disciplines and endeavors—practical, theoretical, artistic. As Rorty pointed out, novelists such as Dickens, Orwell, or Nabokov sometimes speak more effectively to social, political, and ethical issues than do philosophical theorists.²³ We are becoming increasingly aware of the blurring of lines between disciplines, genres, and discourses. Conscious of the need to expand their horizons, scholars and intellectuals of various kinds look over each other's fences. To be effective teachers, philosophers must also try to become "all-purpose intellectuals." Short of bringing about wholesale "fusions of horizons" (dreamed of in Philosophy or in comprehensive critical theories), partial crisscrossings and cross-fertilizations enrich and expand the vocabularies of social and natural scientists, philosophers, and novelists, artists and psychologists, statesmen and historians, computer specialists and policy makers. The life of the mind becomes an analog of a global village.

When the philosophical enterprise is seen as an ongoing series of experiments in thought whose applicability to life situations is open-ended and is not tied to any one definite interpretation, it is likely to energize the students' capacities for intellectual experimentation. That experiment need not be always geared toward practical results. Paying attention to the likelihood that received ideas are open to deconstruction, retextualization, or reconstruction may result in no more than an enlargement of a personal point of view. But such an admittedly limited result should not be underestimated. Besides providing potential resolutions for public issues, adventures among ideas can provide profound private satisfactions as well. This is why Rorty recommends a separation of the private sphere from the public one. In doing so, he returns to the ancient philosophical theme according to which personal reflection and contemplation are among the most satisfying and inalienable human goods. In the house of philosophy there are many mansions—and private rooms as well.

Notes

1. Richard Rorty, *Consequences of Pragmatism* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1982), pp. xiv-xv.

2. Richard Rorty, *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. xvi.

3. Richard Rorty, *Philosophical Papers I: Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 21-45.

4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), Par. 217.

5. For a discussion of the notion of solidarity see Konstantin Kolenda, *Rorty's Humanistic Pragmatism: Philosophy Democratized* (Tampa: University of South Florida Press, 1990), pp. 57-65.

6. Richard Rorty, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (Princeton University Press, 1979), pp. 320-21.

7. "A main course of philosophical disease—a one-sided diet: one nourishes one's thinking with only one kind of example." Wittgenstein, *op. cit.*, Par. 593.

8. Richard Rorty, *Philosophical Papers 2: Essays on Heidegger and Others* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 16.

9. *Op. cit.*, p. 93.

10. See the eloquent chapter on "Private Irony and Liberal Hope" in *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, pp. 73-95.

11. In an illuminating article, "An Historicist View of Teaching Philosophy," Lisa Portmess calls attention to the inescapable cultural element in philosophical theorizing. She claims that "the search for universality obscures the historical and cultural character of the problems perplexing each era." *Teaching Philosophy*, 7:4, October 1984, p. 314.

12. In the second edition of my history of philosophy text I emphasize the developmental character of philosophical thought. See Konstantin Kolenda, *Philosophy's Journey: From Presocratics to the Present* (Prospect Heights, IL: Waveland Press, 1991).

13. F. C. S. Schiller, *Humanistic Pragmatism*, Reuben Abel, ed. (New York: Free Press, 1966), p. 72.

14. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, p. 89.

15. *Teaching Philosophy*, 7:4, October, 1984, pp. 303-312.

16. *Ibid.*, p. 308.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 309.

18. Kai Nielsen, *After the Demise of the Tradition: Rorty, Critical Theory, and the Fate of Philosophy* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1991).

19. *Ibid.*, p. 136.

20. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

21. *Ibid.*, p. 216.

22. *Consequences of Pragmatism*, pp. 207-08.

23. *Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity*, Chapters 7 and 8.

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(Final corrections to this article were made by the Editor)